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I. INTRODUCTION
Tax revenue buoyancy estimates are extensively used in the context of fiscal policy monitoring and
implementation and, in particular, in the analysis, forecasting and surveillance of the revenue side of the
budget. In forecasting terms, tax buoyancy estimates are used in order to calculate the expected stream
of revenues on a “no policy change” basis, based on forecasts for the evolution of the main
macroeconomic variables. Accurate estimates of buoyancies are necessary in order to avoid budget
surprises (e.g. shortfall in revenues) that may lead to mistaken assessments of the fiscal stance. This aspect
is closely related to the issue of fiscal surveillance, especially within the Euro area, as revenue buoyancy
estimates are used in the calculation of cyclically adjusted and structural budget balances, core indicators
within the Stability and Growth Pact framework. As noted in Koester and Preismeier (2017), given that the
business cycle has a major impact on revenues, accurate elasticity estimates are crucial in order to ensure
that the forecasts of cyclical and structural balances are not distorted.
Accurate elasticity estimates are central to the appropriate definition of tax revenue buoyancies. In
particular, in the relevant (policy related as well as academic) literature, the terms tax revenue elasticity
and tax revenue buoyancy both appear and, in some cases, are used interchangeably (e.g. see Koester and
Preismeier (2017)). Nonetheless, it should be noted that the terms have a different meaning, which must
be taken into account. Tax elasticities measure the response of tax revenues to changes in the relevant
tax bases, taking into account the discretionary measures (related to changes in the tax system and
administration, such as changes in statutory tax rates, tax credits etc.) taken by the government. On the
other hand, tax buoyancies measure the overall change of tax revenues that results from a one percentage
change in the levels of GDP.
The role of tax revenue buoyancy estimates has become even more important in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis, as a large number of countries had to face fiscal challenges (increases in the size of
deficit and public debt) with some countries forced into the implementation of consolidation programs.
In particular, within the euro area, for the countries that received financial assistance in the aftermath of
the financial crisis (namely, Greece, Ireland and Portugal) the consolidation programs relied to a large
extent on revenue increases (e.g. the Irish program envisaged revenue increases of up to €5 billion, mainly
from increases in PIT revenues, while for Greece revenue increases were forecast to increase by almost
4% of GDP over the course of the three-year program).
As most of these programs forecasted positive GDP growth rates in the short-run, it is important to
examine whether these increases in GDP will lead to higher or lower respective increases in tax revenues,
that is, to examine whether tax revenue buoyancies are greater than unity. Buoyancy estimates larger
than one imply that tax revenues will increase by more than GDP, thus leading to a higher tax-to-GDP ratio
which could potentially lead to a lower deficit thus ensuring that public finances are on a sustainable path.
On the other hand, if GDP growth is negative, then a buoyancy estimate that is larger than one will imply
a significant deterioration of the tax-to-GDP ratio. Based on these considerations, this strand of the
literature (see Mourre and Princen (2015) and Koester and Preismeier (2017)) classifies a tax as being
regressive or progressive based on the value of the buoyancy estimate; in particular, a tax is characterised
as being regressive (progressive) if the (long-run) buoyancy estimate is below (above) unity (given that an
estimate equal to one is consistent with a constant revenue-to-GDP ratio).
The aim of this paper is to calculate both short- and long-run buoyancy estimates (for Total tax, CIT and
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PIT revenues)1 for a panel of OECD countries, controlling for (discretionary) changes in fiscal policy. 
Moreover, our aim is to identify the relevant position of Ireland within the panel and examine which of 
the tax revenue categories is more effective as an automatic stabilizer in the short-run and in ensuring 
fiscal sustainability in the long-run.  
Our results indicate that the long- and short-run buoyancy estimates of total tax revenues are equal to 
one, making tax revenues a neutral policy stabilizer, while the PIT buoyancy estimates point to a regressive 
system for the whole panel (as the estimates are below unity). CIT buoyancy estimates are the only ones 
that are greater than one, indicating that CIT is the most effective tax policy tool overall. Regarding Ireland, 
the tax system seems to be proportional as the long-run Total Tax revenue buoyancy  is almost equal to 
unity, while the CIT is again shown to be the most effective automatic stabilizer (given that the relevant 
estimates exceed unity). These results are robust to controlling for the asymmetric effects caused by the 
fluctuations of the business cycle. Moreover, we conclude that for the Irish economy, it is important from 
a policy perspective to examine estimates of Irish tax revenue buoyancy, based on GDP and GNP, 
respectively, as there are deviations between the estimates (although the results remain, qualitatively, 
the same).    
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section II discusses the evolution of some headline tax rate 
revenues across the OECD.  Section III presents some theoretical considerations along with the estimation 
approach and the data used. Section IV presents the results of the country-specific and the panel 
estimations, as well as the robustness analysis performed. Finally, section V concludes. 
II. TAX REVENUE GROWTH  
Figure 1 presents the growth trajectory of the tax revenue categories and GDP for a panel of 25 OECD 
countries for the period 1995-2015. We see that for the period 2000-2004 and after the financial crisis 
(2007-2010), tax revenue growth was lower than GDP growth, while for the rest of the period, total tax 
revenue growth was larger than GDP growth. Similar patterns arise for the Personal Income (PIT) and 
Corporate Income tax (CIT) growth trajectories and, in the CIT case, the deviation between the growth 
paths is quite large, especially in the early- to mid-2000s period. These observations point to the fact that 
the respective tax buoyancies have exceeded unity during this period. 
In order to be able to compute accurate tax revenue buoyancy estimates, a distinction must be made 
between short- and long-run estimates. In general, the relevant literature follows the constancy 
assumption concerning revenue buoyancies; that is, it is assumed that the estimates are identical in the 
short- and the long-run term. For example, such estimates based on the constancy assumption were used 
by the OECD in the computation of the Cyclically-Adjusted Balance (see Bouthevillain et.al (2001) and 
Girouard and Andre (2005)).  
However, as mentioned in Koester and Preismeir (2012), Princen et.al (2013) and Mourre and Princen 
(2015), there are a number of reasons to expect that there will be deviations between short- and long-run 
estimates. A significant factor contributing to these deviations is the composition effect of growth, i.e. the 
way in which different components of GDP evolve over time. 
                                                          
1 VAT revenues, even though in many cases represent a significant amount of total tax revenues, are relatively 
sparse in the relevant OECD database (as some countries e.g. USA, do not have VAT), leading to a reduction in 
available observations  
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Figure 1: Growth trajectories of Total tax, PIT and CIT revenues and GDP 
 
Note: The period 1995-2015 was chosen to ensure that we have a balanced panel. Source: OECD National 
Accounts and Revenue Statistics  
For example, if variations in consumption affect the composition of the relevant expenditures this will 
lead to fluctuations in tax revenues in a multi-rate VAT system. Another important factor are the so called 
“dynamic effects”, which refer to certain characteristics of the tax system; e.g. PIT revenues may be 
affected by lags in the collection mechanism, as in some countries income is declared in the following 
year, or CIT revenues in one period may be affected because of losses carried-forward from a previous 
period.  
A first indication of the deviations between short- and long-run estimates is depicted in Figure 2, which 
presents the (deterministic) gross total tax revenue buoyancies, that is, the ratio of the growth of total tax 
revenues to the growth of GDP2. It is evident that the short-run gross estimates are quite volatile, with 
some of them exhibiting changes in sign and others remaining above one (e.g. Portugal) for an extended 
period of time, indicating that the respective long-run buoyancies exceed unity. Moreover, excluding some 
year-specific outliers (the values of 27 for Greece, 8 for Ireland and -6 for Spain which are solely due to 
almost zero GDP growth in those particular years) it seems that the long-run trend of gross estimates is 
around one. Finally, it is important to note that there appears to be no common pattern in the short-run 
buoyancies across countries, pointing to an increased degree of heterogeneity in buoyancies amongst 
countries. 
 
                                                          
2 Koester and Preismeier (2017) mention that these gross elasticities represent a good first approximation for the 
actual elasticity estimates 
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Figure 2: Gross Total Tax Revenue Buoyancies  
 
Source: OECD National Accounts and Revenue Statistics / Blued Line depicts short-run estimates, while 
the red line represents a long-run buoyancy equal to one  
In general, short-run estimates measure how the short-run fluctuations of the business cycle affect tax 
revenues, while the long-run estimates measure the reaction of tax revenues to long-run structural 
changes. From a policy perspective, short-run buoyancies are an important indicator of the tax system’s 
ability to stabilize the economy over the course of the cycle while long-run estimates quantify the impact 
of growth on long-run fiscal sustainability. 
III. TAX REVENUE ELASTICITIES 
A. Theoretical Considerations and Literature Review 
Tax revenue elasticities quantify the effects of a one percentage change in the base of economic activity 
(e.g. GDP or an appropriate macroeconomic base) on the corresponding category of tax revenues. They 
represent the automatic growth potential of the tax system, as they are calculated on a “no policy change” 
basis. 
As noted in Koester and Preismeier (2017), the relevant literature makes a distinction between (net) tax 
elasticity and tax buoyancy measures. While some authors use both terms interchangeably, in general tax 
elasticities are calculated using tax revenue series that have been adjusted so as to take into account 
changes, either legislative or administrative, in the tax policy parameters i.e. tax revenue series that have 
been corrected for discretionary tax measures (DTMs). This is evident from the definition of tax elasticities 
given in Creedy and Gemmell (2003): 
“Revenue responsiveness is the extent to which tax revenues respond to changes in some tax base, usually 
income, in the absence of any discretionary action by the fiscal authority, and is typically measured by the 
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revenue elasticity of tax”. 
On the other hand, tax buoyancy measures the overall observed response of a tax revenue category 
following a one percentage change in the economic base, without taking into account the effects of 
exogenous policy actions. In general, the identification of discretionary measures is important as it helps 
in distinguishing between changes in tax revenues that stem from the evolution of the tax base (i.e. 
endogenous changes) and changes that are the result of exogenous (direct or indirect) policy induced 
measures (e.g. changes in the tax rates etc.). Moreover, some authors have indicated that DTMs might 
play an important role in explaining the variation exhibited by short-run elasticities and their deviation 
from long-run, equilibrium values.  
Barrios and Fargnoli (2010) and Princen et.al (2013) have shown that the size of DTMs is quite small as a 
percentage of revenues (less than 1.4% in EU countries), although there are some cases (for individual 
years and countries) where these measures are indeed large. However, they point out that as gross and 
net elasticities appear to have a high degree of correlation over time, DTMs cannot explain the discrepancy 
between the elasticity estimates.  
Tax buoyancy measures are generally estimated using two approaches: the first one is based on the use 
of analytical expressions, while the second is based on time-series techniques. The first approach (see 
Girouard and Andre (2005) for the OECD estimates and Acheson et.al (2017) for the calculation of income 
tax elasticities for Ireland) is based on the use of detailed micro-data and information regarding the 
national tax code system (e.g. for the Personal Income Tax elasticity, data on the income distribution and 
statutory tax rates are used in order to compute the marginal and average tax rates of the representative 
household). The second approach uses time-series techniques in order to estimate tax elasticities, usually 
by regressing the logarithm of tax revenues on the log of economic activity, while controlling for other 
factors that may affect the evolution of tax revenues. 
The time-series approach to estimating tax revenue buoyancy uses three different concepts (e.g. see 
Mourre et.al. (2013) and Koester and Preismeier (2017)): 
1. Buoyancies with respect to the output gap, which correspond to the percentage 
change in the levels of tax revenues induced by an output gap of 1%. These can be 
decomposed into the following components: elasticity of revenue with respect to its 
base and the elasticity of revenue base with respect to the output gap. These 
elasticity estimates have been used both by the European Commission and the OECD 
within the fiscal surveillance framework. 
2. Buoyancies with respect to a macroeconomic base, where an appropriate national 
accounts category is used as a proxy for the relevant tax base (e.g. the wage bill is 
usually used as a proxy for the base of the Personal Income Tax and Gross Operating 
Surplus for CIT). 
3. Buoyancies of tax revenues with respect to GDP; this measure has the advantage of 
allowing for comparisons across different tax categories (given that the tax base is 
now the same) and across countries. Moreover, when compared to elasticities with 
respect to the output gap, it has the advantage that it uses an observable base. 
Finally, as indicated in Princen et.al. (2013), these elasticity estimates are quite close 
to the ones calculated based on the output gap. 
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In this paper we follow the third concept and choose GDP as the (common) base of economic activity, as 
we are interested in cross-country comparisons in order to identify, among others, the relevant position 
of the Irish economy within the panel of countries. Moreover, we begin with estimating revenue 
buoyancies as there is no dataset available containing detailed information on tax reforms and other 
changes to the tax system for the panel of OECD countries3.  
It should be noted that the time-series approach has the advantage of encompassing the overall net effect 
of existing rules regarding tax credits, exemptions and deductions, thus allowing for international 
comparisons. On the other hand, it does not take into account information related to statutory rates, 
income distribution etc. which are an integral part of the analytical approach to elasticity estimations     
Although, as already mentioned, we expect that under this approach there won’t be large differences 
between the estimates of tax buoyancy and tax elasticity. In order to control for changes in the tax 
structure we will include in the econometric specifications time series of tax rates, as changes in these 
rates over time can be considered as a proxy of discretionary measures (and thus provide us with an 
indication of the size of tax elasticities). 
The literature on dynamic tax elasticity estimates can be broadly distinguished between country-specific 
estimates and that based on a panel approach. Moreover, within these approaches, another distinction 
arises in the use of tax revenue series that have been adjusted for discretionary tax policy measures.  
The first paper to provide a time-series estimation of short- and long-run tax elasticities is Sobel and 
Holcombe (1996), who used an Error Correction Model (ECM) to estimate tax base income elasticities for 
the USA and the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. Bruce et.al (2006) extend this methodology by 
incorporating asymmetric responses of short-run estimates, taking into account the relationship between 
actual and expected tax base growth. They applied their method to the US states in order to obtain tax-
to-base elasticities. Poghosyan (2011) assesses the variability of tax elasticities in Lithuania, while Wolswijk 
(2007, 2009) and Koester and Preismeier (2012) calculate dynamic tax revenue elasticities for Netherlands 
and Germany, respectively, utilizing databases of neutral tax revenues, that is, tax revenue series that 
have been adjusted for the effects of discretionary tax measures.  
The same approach is used by Havranek et.al (2015) for the Czech Republic, although the authors use 
quarterly data in their estimations. Deli et.al (2016) estimate income tax revenue elasticities for Ireland, 
using as a base of economic activity both GDP and GNP, while also controlling for financial sector effects. 
Finally, Koester and Preismeier (2017) and Boschi and d’Addona (2017) provide country-specific tax-to-
GDP elasticity estimates for the EU countries, with the latter introducing a regime-switching approach. As 
regards panel estimations, Belinga et.al (2014) provide tax-to-GDP elasticity estimates for a panel of OECD 
countries while Dudine and Jalles (2017) extend this analysis to a larger heterogeneous panel. Finally, 
Mourre and Princen (2015) provide panel estimations of dynamic tax elasticities for the EU, using a dataset 
that has been adjusted for DTMs.  
 
                                                          
3There is one dataset that contains information on discretionary tax measures for EU member states, developed by 
the Output Gap Working Group of the Economic Policy Committee of the European Commission presented in Barrios 
and Fargnoli (2010) and Princen et.al (2013) that has been recently utilized in Mourre and Princen (2015). However, 
this dataset has not been made publicly available.    
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B. Econometric Specification and Estimation Approach 
Our econometric specification is based on the following Autoregressive Distributed Lag model -ARDL(p,q): 
 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖,𝑗𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖,𝑗𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑞
𝑗=0   (1) 
where 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 denotes the logarithm of the relevant tax category for country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 denotes the 
logarithm of GDP, 𝜇𝑖  are country-specific fixed effects and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error-term.  
The choice of the appropriate lags for equation (1) is based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), 
which indicated that the optimal lag-length is 𝑝 = 𝑞 = 1. Therefore: 
 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖,1𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑖,0𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (2) 
Now, equation (2) can be transformed into the following Error Correction Model (ECM): 
 𝛥𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖 (𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜃𝑖,0𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (3) 
where 𝜆𝑖 = −(1 − 𝑎𝑖,1), 𝛽𝜄 =
𝜃𝑖,0+𝜃𝑖,1
(1−𝑎𝑖,1)
 . 
In this specification, 𝛽𝑖 measures the long-run effects of a change in GDP levels on tax revenues, i.e. it 
denotes the long-run tax revenue buoyancy. The 𝜃𝑖,0 parameter measures the instantaneous response of 
tax revenues to changes in GDP (i.e. the short-run buoyancy), while 𝜆𝑖 measures the (country-specific) 
speed of adjustment between the short- and the long-run; that is, it measures the speed by which the 
elasticity converges to its equilibrium value. 
Equation (3) is estimated for the whole panel using the Mean Group (MG) estimator of Pesaran and Smith 
(1995) and the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator of Pesaran et.al. (1999), in order to take into account 
the possible heterogeneity in the panel, both in terms of differences in elasticity estimates across 
countries and in terms of the dynamic adjustment process towards the long-run equilibrium. 
 In particular, the standard Fixed Effects approach to panel estimation imposes a large degree of 
homogeneity, given that it consists of pooling the available data and allowing only for the intercepts (the 
𝜇𝑖  parameter in equation (3)) to vary across countries. 
On the other hand, the MG estimator allows for a large degree of heterogeneity, as it is assumed that both 
the intercepts and the slopes (i.e. the buoyancies) are allowed to vary across countries, both in the short- 
and in the long-run. The buoyancies are estimated following the per-country estimation of equation (3) 
and then a simple arithmetic average of the country-specific estimates is calculated for the whole panel. 
The PMG estimator is a combination of pooling and averaging, as it allows for the short-run estimates of 
the intercepts and the slopes to vary but imposes long-run homogeneity, in the sense that the long-run 
elasticity estimates are constrained to be equal across countries.  
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C. Data 
Our dataset comprises an unbalanced panel of annual tax revenues covering 25 OECD countries4 between 
1965 and 2015. The availability of data differs among countries and subcategories of tax revenues, being 
relatively sparse for the period 1965-1995 (as there are, among others, different accession dates to the 
OECD and different coverage dates by national authorities). The number of years per country varies from 
20 years for Slovakia and Slovenia to 50 years for the oldest members.  
The tax categories used in this paper, apart from Total Tax revenues, are Personal Income Tax (PIT) and 
Corporate Income Tax (CIT). Moreover, we include tax rate data and, in particular, following Dudine and 
Talles (2017) we use the highest marginal PIT for the PIT revenues rate and the base statutory CIT rate for 
the CIT revenues. The data source is the Revenue Statistics series of the OECD. It should be noted here 
that the PIT and CIT rates database spans only the period 2000-2015, thereby greatly reducing the time 
dimension of the sample and the number of observations that will be included in the regression analysis. 
For the CIT rates series, we were able to extend the time coverage by almost 20 years by including data 
from Devereux et.al that cover the period 1979-2002, albeit for a smaller number of countries (18 out of 
the original 25 of our sample). Finally, the dataset includes data on GDP and the rate of inflation, taken 
from the National Accounts database and the Consumer Indices series of the OECD, respectively.    
In Figures 3 and 4 we have plotted the evolution of Total Tax revenues and PIT, CIT revenues, respectively, 
while Table 1 presents a summary of the basic statistics. It is evident that total tax revenues have remained 
relatively stable over this period, with a decline occurring in 2007-2009, marking the negative impact of 
the financial crisis. In the years following the crisis, tax revenues again increased reaching the pre-crisis 
levels, although 2015 marks another drop, caused by a decline in tax revenue collection. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
     
 Mean Median Min Max 
Total 254.8 73.42 1.294 4754.1 
PIT 75.73 21.41 0.222 1763.6 
CIT 20.28 5.956 0.0612 425.2 
 
The same picture arises in the case of the PIT and CIT revenues. They have remained relatively stable over 
the period and, although there seemed to be a recovery to the pre-crisis levels especially for PIT revenues, 
the trajectory was once again reversed in 2014.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of Total Tax Revenues. 
                                                          
4 Namely: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, 
US 
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Note: The data cover the period 1995-2015 only, to ensure that we have a balanced panel that includes 
all 25 countries of the sample. Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 
Figure 4: Evolution of PIT and CIT. 
 
Note: The data cover the period 1995-2015 only, to ensure that we have a balanced panel that includes 
all 25 countries of the sample. Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 
IV. RESULTS 
A. Country-Specific Estimations 
We first estimate equation (3) for total tax revenues, as well as the Personal and Corporate Income Tax, 
using the MG estimator, in order to obtain country-per-country estimates of the short- and long-run 
buoyancies, as well as estimates for the speed of adjustment.  
Table 2 presents a summary of the results while figure 5 presents the kernel densities of the long-run 
buoyancy estimates. The average of the total tax revenue buoyancy coefficients is slightly above unity 
(1.029) and most estimates (18 out of 25) are greater than one. However, similar to Dudine and Jalles 
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(2017), we cannot take this result as an implication that long-run tax buoyancies are significantly different 
from unity. Rather, the relevant Wald test (last column of table 2) indicates that for the majority of 
countries long-run elasticity estimates are in fact equal to one. The long-run total tax revenue elasticity 
for Ireland is 0.894 (see Table 4), lower compared to the median value and statistically different from one. 
As regards the long-run PIT buoyancy estimates, on average they are slightly lower than one and the 
distribution of the estimates is skewed to the right, with only 10 out of the 25 countries of the sample 
exhibiting estimates that exceed unity. Again, the relevant Wald test indicated that for 16 countries we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the long-run PIT buoyancy estimate is equal to one.   
For the CIT long-run estimates, we observe that the distribution of estimates is heavily skewed to the left, 
with 20 out of the 25 countries having a point estimate exceeding unity, however the hypothesis that the 
long-run value is equal to one cannot be rejected for 18 countries. Ireland exhibits a large CIT elasticity of 
1.27, higher compared to the median value, although statistically not different from unity. 
In general, cross-country variation is quite low for the Total tax revenue estimates, with a standard 
deviation of 0.07, while for the CIT elasticity estimates the standard deviation is 0.2. These results, 
combined with the point estimates, indicate that the long-run total tax buoyancy has been, on average, 
equal to one while CIT buoyancy has exhibited a much larger degree of variability.    
The estimates for the speed of adjustment are negative and statistically significant for all countries, a 
result consistent with the theoretical expectation of convergence to long-run, equilibrium values. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Long-run Elasticity Estimates 
       
 Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Elasticity =1 
Total 1.029 1.024 0.0777 0.894 1.296 16 countries 
PIT 0.983 0.970 0.165 0.695 1.372 16 countries 
CIT 1.157 1.129 0.195 0.800 1.562 18 countries 
Note: The total number of countries in the sample is 25. The last column presents the results of the Wald test 
that the elasticity estimate is equal to one. 
The summary statistics from the estimation of the short-run buoyancies can be found in Table 3 and the 
respective kernel densities are depicted in Figure 6. The average of the short-run Total Tax revenue buoyancy is 
slightly above unity, with only 50% of the countries exhibiting point estimates that are greater than one. 
However, the Wald test indicates that for 22 out of the 25 countries the estimates are not statistically different 
from one which, when combined with the fact that the variation across countries is relatively low (standard 
deviation equal to 0.11), indicates that the short-run buoyancy estimates have been on average equal to one 
over the period. The same holds for the short-run PIT estimates, where the large dispersion (0.17) is explained 
mainly by the large point estimates for USA (1.77), which is twice the size of the lowest estimate for the sample, 
recorded for Greece. The distribution of the short-run PIT estimates is skewed to the right with only 8 countries 
having an elasticity greater than one. In both cases, the estimates for Ireland are slightly lower than the median 
value (0.991 for the short-run Total Tax revenue elasticity and 0.93 for PIT), although they are not statistically 
different from one. 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Short-run Elasticity Estimates 
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 Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Elasticity=1 
Total 1.016 0.995 0.110 0.876 1.504 22 countries 
PIT 1.011 0.981 0.174 0.845 1.771 25 countries 
CIT 1.371 1.221 0. 588 0.685 3.863 23 countries 
Note: The total number of countries in the sample is 25 
Figure 5: Kernel Densities of Long-Run Buoyancies 
 
Finally, the short-run CIT elasticity estimates are on average larger than one, with a mean value of 1.371 
and with 23 countries having estimated coefficients greater than one, causing their distribution to be 
heavily skewed to the left. Moreover, they exhibit a greater degree of variability (standard deviation equal 
to 0.59) compared to the previous two cases. Only two of the countries have a buoyancy estimate that is 
lower than one (namely, Luxemburg and Sweden) while the largest estimates are the ones recorded for 
the US (3.86) and Finland (2.04). Ireland has a CIT buoyancy estimate of 1.26, larger compared to the 
median valued and almost equal to the respective long-run estimate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Kernel Densities of Short-Run Buoyancies 
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Overall, regarding the estimates for the Irish economy (Table 4) we see that they exhibit a very low degree of 
variability (as indicated by the small differences between the long- and short-run estimates). The differences 
observed could be the result of discretionary measures undertaken by the government (see section C. II where 
we use proxies in order to control for these changes) as well as business cycle fluctuations (see section C.III). 
Moreover, as already stated in the introduction, the differences between short-and long-run estimates may be 
due to the composition of income growth (e.g. a reduction in the wage-share could lead to decreases in the PIT 
estimates and increases in CIT estimates).  
Table 4: Short- and Long-run Elasticity Estimates for Ireland 
 Total PIT CIT 
Long-run Elasticity 0.894*** 
(0.027) 
0.828*** 
(0.045) 
1.267*** 
(0.235)  
Short-run Elasticity 0.991*** 
(0.077) 
0.93*** 
(0.113) 
1.256*** 
(0.232)  
Speed of Adjustment -0.359*** 
(0.12) 
-0.278*** 
(0.113) 
-0.099*** 
(0.232)  
Note: Results from the PG estimation of equation (3). Bold means statistically not different from 1 at the 
5% level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
B. Dynamic Panel Estimations 
Table 5 contains the coefficient estimates for the short- and long-run buoyancies, as well as the speed of 
adjustment, based on the estimation of equation (3) by the MG and the PMG estimators, using the full 
panel of countries. Long-run Total Tax revenue point estimates are only slightly larger than unity, and in 
fact not statistically different from one, both for the MG and the PMG estimates, a result that is in line 
with the per-country estimations.  The same holds for the short-run Total Tax estimates. 
Table 5: Panel Elasticity Estimates 
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Estimator  PMG   MG  
 Total Tax PIT CIT Total Tax PIT CIT 
Long-run 
Elasticity 
1.006*** 
(0.00514) 
0.891*** 
(0.0114) 
1.163*** 
(0.0267) 
1.030*** 
(0.0155) 
0.983*** 
(0.0330) 
1.157*** 
(0.0390) 
 
Short-run 
Elasticity 
1.005*** 
(0.0122) 
0.986*** 
(0.0166) 
1.361*** 
(0.130) 
1.017*** 
(0.0221) 
1.012*** 
(0.0349) 
1.372*** 
(0.118) 
 
Speed of 
Adjustment 
-0.194*** 
(0.0279) 
-0.172*** 
(0.0253) 
-0.261*** 
(0.0295) 
-0.256*** 
(0.0312) 
-0.255*** 
(0.0278) 
-0.320*** 
(0.0282) 
 
Observations 967 956 956 967 956 956 
Note: Estimations from equation (3) using the PMG and MG estimators. Bold means statistically not 
different from 1 at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
As regards the tax subcategories, the PIT estimates are less than unity, with the exception of the MG short-
run estimate; however, even this coefficient is not statistically different from one. Finally, in the CIT case, 
point estimates for the short- and the long-run are greater than one, a result that according to Belinga 
et.al (2014) can be attributed to the fact that during the period under examination there has been a 
gradual increase in the share of capital-income ratio (see Stockhammer (2013)). 
In all cases, the speed of adjusted coefficients have the expected negative sign and are statistically 
significant, consistent with the assumption of long-run convergence. 
In general, we observe a similar pattern in the results obtained from both estimators. This might indicate 
that the long-run slope homogeneity assumption imposed by the PMG estimator does not greatly distort 
the estimated coefficient values. Further evidence that the PMG estimator is preferable in this case can 
be obtained by performing the Hausman test. The PMG estimator yields efficient and consistent estimates 
only when the restrictions (slope homogeneity) imposed are valid, whereas the MG estimator is always 
efficient. The Hausman test is used to examine the differences between the two models and the results 
indicate that for the Total Tax and CIT cases the PMG estimator is in fact the preferred one. 
Before proceeding to the robustness checks in Table 6 we present some regression results for two sub-
periods, namely before and after 2000. This split is mainly dictated by the fact that, as already stated, for 
our main control variables (PIT and CIT rates) observations are available only for the post-2000 period. 
On average, long-run Total Tax revenue buoyancy has remained relatively stable and close to unity over 
the two periods, with the estimate of the pre-2000 period not statistically different from one. The short-
run estimates exhibit a very small increase in the post-2000 period; however they are both not statistically 
different from one.  
 
 
 
Table 6: PMG estimations for the two sub-samples 
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 Total Pre-
2000 
Total Post-
2000 
PIT Pre-2000 PIT Post-
2000 
CIT Pre-2000 CIT Post-
2000 
Long-run 
Elasticity 
1.006*** 
(0.00771) 
1.078*** 
(0.0184) 
0.907*** 
(0.0157) 
0.964*** 
(0.0184) 
1.348*** 
(0.0476) 
0.992*** 
(0.0325) 
 
Short-run 
Elasticity 
0.994*** 
(0.0237) 
1.067*** 
(0.0595) 
1.035*** 
(0.0570) 
0.959*** 
(0.0646) 
1.130*** 
(0.0908) 
1.725*** 
(0.296) 
 
Speed of 
Adjustment 
-0.222*** 
(0.0388) 
-0.239*** 
(0.0394) 
-0.278*** 
(0.0452) 
-0.307*** 
(0.0374) 
-0.272*** 
(0.0412) 
-0.473*** 
(0.0531) 
 
Observations 593 374 583 373 583 373 
Note: Estimations from equation (3) using the PMG estimator. Bold means statistically not different from 
1 at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 
1 percent levels, respectively. 
The long-run PIT buoyancy estimates increase in the post-2000 period, however they remain lower than 
unity, while the short-run estimates exhibit the opposite pattern and decrease in the post-2000 period 
(and they remain statistically not different from one). 
Finally, in the CIT estimates we observe the following interesting pattern: long-run elasticities decline 
substantially over time, while the short-run estimates exhibit a large increase, from 1.23 to 1.724 in the 
post-2000 period. 
The short-run buoyancy estimates from the PMG estimator for Ireland are presented in Table 7. It is 
evident that the elasticity estimates in the post-2000 period are larger, both when compared to the pre-
2000 period as well as when compared with the whole sample estimation, with the exception of the PIT 
point estimate that exhibits a large decrease. This result may reflect the fact that the Irish wage-share has 
declined in the second part of the 2000s (following the crisis). This combined with the fact that the Irish 
PIT system has become more progressive following a number of reforms in the early 2000s, may explain 
the decrease in the PIT estimate along with the large increase in the CIT estimate.  
Table 7: Estimations for Ireland for the two sub-samples 
 Total Pre-
2000 
Total Post-
2000 
PIT Pre-2000 PIT Post-
2000 
CIT Pre-2000 CIT Post-
2000 
Short-run 
Elasticity 
1.002*** 
(0.074) 
1.129 *** 
(0.159) 
1.158 *** 
(0.109) 
0.62 *** 
(0.154) 
1.091*** 
(0.332) 
1.571*** 
(0.219) 
 
Speed of 
Adjustment 
-0.392*** 
(0.121) 
-0.4 
(0.3) 
-0.381*** 
(0.094) 
-0.608*** 
(0.188) 
-0.14 
(0.118) 
-0.31*** 
(0.111) 
 
Note: Estimations from equation (3) using the PMG estimator. Bold means statistically not different from 
1 at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 
1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
C. Robustness Checks 
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I. Controlling for tax rates 
As already stated, the difference between tax buoyancy and tax elasticity measures stems from the effects 
of discretionary tax policy changes; that is, exogenous changes in the tax policy parameters such the tax 
rates, exemptions, the tax base etc. Such tax reforms were enacted starting in the late 1980s for several 
countries (see Belinga et.al (2014) and Dudine and Jalles (2017)) and, more recently, since the mid-to-late 
2000s as a response to the global financial crisis, especially in European countries that were under 
pressure to restore the balance of their public finances. If these policy changes are correlated with tax 
revenues and GDP, then this may lead to deviations between buoyancy and elasticity measures. Given 
that no comprehensive database containing information on such changes is publicly available, we use tax 
rates as control variables, as they have been utilized in the literature as proxies for the discretionary 
changes in tax policy and will provide us with a first approximation to the size of tax elasticities. In 
particular, we use data on statutory CIT rates and top statutory PIT rates from the OECD Tax Revenue 
database. 
As the coverage of the data obtained from the OECD database is limited, the sample size is greatly 
reduced. In particular, both PIT and CIT rates are available for the period 2000-2015. The results of the 
regressions including the controls are presented in table 8. 
Table 8: PIT and CIT Elasticities, Controlling for Tax Rates  
 PIT PIT (with control) CIT  CIT (with control) 
Long-run 
Elasticity 
0.964*** 
(0.0184) 
0.988*** 
(0.0158) 
0.992*** 
(0.0325) 
1.186*** 
(0.0555) 
     
Short-run 
Elasticity 
0.959*** 
(0.0646) 
0.961*** 
(0.0780) 
1.725*** 
(0.296) 
1.793*** 
(0.307) 
     
Speed of 
Adjustment 
-0.307*** 
(0.0374) 
-0.384*** 
(0.0423) 
-0.473*** 
(0.0531) 
-0.507*** 
(0.0630) 
     
Observations 373 373 373 373 
Note: Estimations from equation (3) using the PMG estimator. Bold means statistically not different from 
1 at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 
1 percent levels, respectively. 
Following the inclusion of PIT rates, the PIT long-run elasticity estimate exhibits a slight increase although 
it still remains below one, while the short-run estimate remains essentially unchanged. All estimates 
remain statistically equal to unity. The inclusion of CIT rates has led to an increase in the long-run estimate, 
which is now larger and significantly different than one, while the short-run estimate has a small increase 
in magnitude. 
 
 
 
Table 9: Short-run Elasticity Estimates for Ireland with Controls 
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 PIT  CIT  
 Without Controls With Controls Without Controls With Controls 
Short-run 
Elasticity 
0.62*** 
(0.154) 
0.56*** 
(0.17) 
1.571*** 
(0.219) 
1.584*** 
(0.242) 
  
Speed of 
Adjustment 
-0.608*** 
(0.188) 
-0.782*** 
(0.191) 
-0.31*** 
(0.111) 
-0.31*** 
(0.111) 
  
Note: Results from the PMG estimation of equation (3). Bold means statistically not different from 1 at 
the 5% level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
The Irish results indicate that the PIT system is regressive in the post-2000 period, as the elasticity estimate 
is now 0.56, even lower then when we do not control for tax policy changes. The CIT estimate exhibits a 
small increase, remaining quite larger than one which implies that the CIT is the most effective automatic 
stabilizer. This stability can be explained by the fact that during the period under examination (2000-2015) 
CIT rates have remained stable since 2003. 
As an additional robustness check, we use the CIT rates database of Devereux et.al, which allows us to 
extend the time-span of the sample by almost 21 years; that is, the new sample covers the period 1979-
2015. However, the cross-section dimension of the panel is now shorter, given that the new data only 
cover 18 out of the original 25 countries of the sample. 
Table 10: CIT Elasticities, Controlling for Tax Rates in an Extended Sample 
 CIT CIT with control 
Long-run Elasticity 1.184*** 
(0.0285) 
1.185*** 
(0.0549)  
Short-run Elasticity 1.423*** 
(0.173) 
1.524*** 
(0.228)  
Speed of Adjustment -0.258*** 
(0.0363) 
-0.281*** 
(0.0400)  
Observations 734 621 
Note: Estimations from equation (3) using the PMG estimator. Bold means statistically not different from 
1 at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 
1 percent levels, respectively. 
In this sample, we observe that the inclusion of the CIT rates causes a significant increase in the short-run 
elasticity estimate, while the long-run value remains essentially unchanged. In the Irish case, the short-
run CIT elasticity estimate remains remarkably stable (1.256 after the inclusion of the controls compared 
to a value of 1.238 without the controls). Again this can be attributed to the fact that, since 1979, CIT rates 
in Ireland have remained stable for the majority of the time period.  
Overall, for the whole panel, in the case of PIT, the inclusion of the tax rate control does not in fact cause 
significant change in the results (indicating that buoyancy and elasticity measures are the same). However, 
this does not appear to be the case for the short-run CIT estimates. 
 
II. Controlling for Inflation 
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The second robustness check that we perform is related to the (possible) effects of inflation. In particular, 
in our initial estimations we used the nominal series of tax revenues and GDP, which contain both a price 
and a real component. By running the regressions again using the rate of inflation as an additional control 
variable we can examine whether price developments do affect the evolution of tax revenues. If the 
inflation coefficients are statistically insignificant, we may conclude that the same relationships would be 
obtained had we used real variables.  
Table 11 contains the results of the regressions; it may be observed that the inflation coefficients are 
statistically insignificant both in short- and in the long-run. Moreover, the total tax revenue elasticity 
estimates do not exhibit significant changes following the inclusion of the control variable (and remain 
statistically not different from unity). Thus, we can conclude that for this sample of countries, elasticity 
estimates are neutral to changes in inflation rates. 
Table 11: Total Tax Revenue Elasticity with and without Controlling for Inflation 
 Not Controlling for Inflation Controlling for Inflation 
Long-run Elasticity 1.006*** 
(0.00514) 
1.005*** 
(0.00732) 
Short-run Elasticity 1.005*** 
(0.0122) 
0.999*** 
(0.0111) 
Long-run price effect  -0.0652 
(0.141) 
Short-run price effect  0.0816 
(0.0681) 
Speed of Adjustment -0.194*** 
(0.0279) 
-0.192*** 
(0.0284)  
Observations 967 965 
Note: Bold means statistically not different from 1 at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, 
**, * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively 
III. Asymmetric Effects of the Business Cycle 
The observed differences between short- and long-run estimates may be, in part, attributed to cyclical 
fluctuations which cause discrepancies in the short-term response of tax revenues. That is, there may be 
asymmetries in the short-run tax buoyancy estimates that cause the variations in the stabilization role of 
taxation during the different phases of the business cycle.  
In order to take into account these possible asymmetries, we include in equation (3) a dummy variable 
that captures the different phases of the cycle. In particular, the dummy variable takes the value of one 
in years of positive GDP growth and is interacted with the short-run buoyancy estimate as follows (see 
also Belinga et.al (2014)): 
 
𝛥𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖 (𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜃𝑖,0 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 ∗ 𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜃𝑖,0 ∗ (1 − 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) ∗ 𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
 
so that we obtain two short-run estimates: one for the expansionary and one for the contractionary phase.  
Table 12 shows that the tax buoyancy estimates for total tax revenues are large during the contractionary 
phase of the cycle rather than the expansionary period, indicating that the tax systems in this sample of 
OECD countries seem to work better as automatic stabilizers in the contractionary phase of the cycle. This 
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result holds in particular for CIT buoyancies for the panel as a whole, as they exhibit the largest value.  
In the Irish case (Table 13), the estimates indicate that CIT seems to work better as an automatic stabilizer 
during contractionary periods, having a larger value than the PIT estimates. The tax system as a whole 
exhibits short-run buoyancies that are larger during these periods, indicating that it performs better as an 
automatic stabilizer in bad times rather than good.  
Table 12: Asymmetric Short-run Buoyancy Estimates  
 Total Tax PIT CIT 
Short-run Estimate 
(expansion) 
0.996*** 
(0.0121) 
0.988*** 
(0.0345) 
1.269*** 
(0.129) 
 
Short-run Estimate 
(contraction) 
1.222*** 
(0.228) 
1.391*** 
(0.503) 
1.712*** 
(0.285) 
 
Speed of Adjustment -0.193*** 
(0.0287) 
-0.176*** 
(0.0256) 
-0.260*** 
(0.0310)  
Observations 967 956 956 
Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively 
Table 13: Asymmetric Short-run Buoyancy Estimates for Ireland 
 Total Tax PIT CIT 
Short-run Estimate 
(expansion) 
1.003*** 
(0.108) 
1.024*** 
(0.138) 
1.144*** 
(0.268) 
 
Short-run Estimate 
(contraction) 
1.15*** 
(0.325) 
0.688* 
(0.393) 
1.612** 
(0.775) 
 
Speed of Adjustment -0.066 
(0.101) 
-0.268*** 
(0.094) 
-0.079  
(0.063)  
Observations 34 34 34 
Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively 
IV. Differences between using GDP and GNP 
All elasticity estimates presented in this paper have been derived using GDP as a base for economic 
activity. However, particularly for the case of Ireland, GDP may not be the appropriate indicator for the 
measurement of domestic activity, due to the impact of large multinational firms on net factor income 
(e.g. due to the repatriation of profits). As a result, it has been argued that GNP may present a more 
accurate depiction of the Irish economic activity. This is evident from figure 7 which plots the evolution of 
GDP and GNP measures. In subplot (a) we observe that GDP is always larger compared to GNP, while in 
subplots (b) and (c) the magnitude of the difference between the two measures, both in levels and in logs 
is presented. It is evident that the difference follows an upward trend, indicative of the distortions caused 
in GDP due to the foreign-owned firms. 
This is also the case for other economies in the EU, such as Luxembourg and Netherlands, which exhibit 
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large FDI inflows. For example, in the 2014-2016 period, GNP in Luxembourg was, on average, €18 billion 
lower compared to GDP, indicating that caution must be taken as to what is the appropriate measure of 
economic activity.   
In order to take into account the possible effects of the differences between GDP and GNP, we use a 
country-specific Error Correction Model for Ireland in order to estimate short- and long-run elasticity 
estimates, as well as the adjustment coefficient, following the two-stage approach of Engle and Granger 
(1987).  
In the first stage, the long-run relationship between the respective tax category and GDP is estimated 
using the Dynamic OLS estimator (see Stock and Watson (1993)), in order to correct for possible coefficient 
bias and serial correlation: 
 𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑌𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝛥𝑌𝑡+𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑗
𝑖=−𝑗   (4) 
where 𝑇𝑡 is the log of the respective tax category and 𝑌 is the log of the measure of economic activity 
(either GDP or GNP) in period t. The leads and lags introduced for the log of GDP are the so-called 
“nuisance” terms that are used in the DOLS estimator to correct for possible endogeneity and 
autocorrelation issues. The lags of the nuisance terms are chosen based on Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC). In the estimation process, we use the Newey and West (1987) method to calculate standard errors. 
The 𝛼1 coefficient is the estimate of the long-run elasticity.  
In the second step, the following Error-Correction Model is estimated via OLS, using the residuals from 
the long-run specification: 
   𝛥𝑇𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝛥𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽3𝜀?̂?−1 + 𝑢𝑡  
(5) 
 
The 𝛽1 coefficient is the short-run elasticity estimate, i.e. it measures the contemporaneous effect of a 
change in Y, while the 𝛽3 coefficient measures the speed of adjustment toward the long-run, equilibrium 
value of the elasticity. Some authors (e.g. Koester and Preismeier (2017)) included lags of the dependent 
variable in specification (5), in order to account for serial correlation; the results from the relevant 
statistical tests indicate that there are no signs of serial correlation in our case.  
The results from the regressions are presented in table 12. It is evident that the use of GNP leads to slightly 
larger long-run estimates, while the short-run estimates are now substantially lower (although, with the 
exception of the short-run CIT elasticity, the estimates are not statistically different from one).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Evolution of GDP and GNP 
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Table 12: Elasticity estimates using GDP and GNP as bases 
Base  GDP   GNP  
 Total Tax PIT CIT Total Tax PIT CIT 
Long-run 
Elasticity 
0.927*** 
(0.0104) 
0.866*** 
(0.0238) 
1.338*** 
(0.0419) 
1.021*** 
(0.0165) 
0.958*** 
(0.0248) 
1.462*** 
(0.0514) 
 
Short-run 
Elasticity 
1.007*** 
(0.0812) 
0.953*** 
(0.115) 
1.327*** 
(0.225) 
0.768*** 
(0.145) 
0.756*** 
(0.159) 
1.182*** 
(0.290) 
 
Speed of 
Adjustment 
-0.475** 
(0.177) 
-0.241** 
(0.113) 
-0.101 
(0.078) 
-0.736*** 
(0.202) 
-0.449*** 
(0.130) 
-0.0887 
(0.0890) 
 
Observations 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Note: Estimations from equation (3). Bold means statistically not different from 1 at the 5% level. Standard 
errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
In order to control for the effects of discretionary changes in the conduct of tax policy on the CIT revenue 
elasticity estimates, we include CIT tax rates in the specification. As we can see in table 13, both in the 
cases of GDP and GNP we observe that the long-run estimates are slightly decreased, while for the short-
run estimates (and especially for the GNP case) the change is negligible. 
Finally, when we control for the effects of inflation we observe that the long-run estimates of Total Tax 
revenues decrease while the short-run ones exhibit a marginal increase (and for the GNP case, both 
estimates are not statistically different from one). These results, combined with the fact that the inflation 
estimates are statistically significant, indicate that the elasticity estimates are not neutral with respect to 
price changes. 
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Table 13: Controlling for CIT rates 
 GDP GDP (with control) GNP  GNP (with control) 
Long-run Elasticity 1.338*** 
(0.0419) 
1.299*** 
(0.0422) 
1.462*** 
(0.0514) 
1.414*** 
(0.0529) 
     
Short-run 
Elasticity 
1.327*** 
(0.225) 
1.347*** 
(0.236) 
1.182*** 
(0.290) 
1.180*** 
(0.291) 
     
Speed of 
Adjustment 
-0.101 
(0.078) 
-0.0937 
(0.0857) 
-0.0887 
(0.0890) 
-0.0893 
(0.0967) 
     
Observations 34 34 34 34 
Note: Estimations from equation (3). Bold means statistically not different from 1 at the 5% level. Standard 
errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
Table 14: Controlling Total Tax Revenues for Inflation 
 GDP GDP (with 
control) 
GNP  GNP (with 
control) 
Long-run 
Elasticity 
0.927*** 
(0.0104) 
0.907*** 
(0.0132) 
1.021*** 
(0.0165) 
0.995*** 
(0.0187) 
     
Short-run 
Elasticity 
1.007*** 
(0.0812) 
1.020*** 
(0.0847) 
0.768*** 
(0.145) 
0.8*** 
(0.153) 
     
Speed of 
Adjustment 
-0.475** 
(0.177) 
-0.527** 
(0.206) 
-0.736*** 
(0.202) 
-0.523*** 
(0.585) 
     
Observations 34 34 34 34 
Note: Estimations from equation (3). Bold means statistically not different from 1 at the 5% level. Standard 
errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
Overall, our results indicate that the tax system in Ireland is proportional, as indicated by the long-run 
Total tax revenue elasticity estimate (in the sense that it implies a constant revenue-to-GDP ratio in the 
long-run), while PIT is slightly regressive. The CIT appears to be the most effective policy instrument, in 
the sense that in the short-run it ensures that the respective growth in revenues will exceed that of GDP 
(since the elasticity estimate is almost 1.2) making it a good automatic stabilizer, while in the long-run it 
contributes to fiscal sustainability (since the elasticity estimate is 1.4). Finally, the degree of volatility (as 
measured by the difference of long- and short-run elasticity estimates) is almost the same across tax 
categories. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper provides estimates of short- and long-run buoyancies for Total Tax revenues, as well as Personal 
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Income tax and Corporate Income tax revenues, for a panel of 25 OECD countries over the period 1965-
2015. The empirical approach was based on the Mean Group and Pooled Mean Group estimators, which 
allow for a large degree of heterogeneity among the panel. 
Our results indicate that long-run Total Tax revenue elasticities are not significantly different from one for 
the whole panel, a result that also holds for 15 out of 25 countries in the sample. This result is robust to 
changes in prices and indicates that GDP growth has an overall neutral effect on fiscal performance (as 
regards the revenue side of the budget). The same holds for the short-run elasticity estimate (also 
statistically equal to unity) implying that tax revenues are a neutral automatic stabilizer. As regards the 
main tax categories, long-run PIT elasticity estimates are slightly lower than one for the whole period, as 
well as in the two sub-samples, pointing to a regressive PIT system for the whole panel. Short-run PIT 
estimates are also statistically equal to one, although they exhibit a small increase in the post-2000 period. 
Finally, long-run CIT estimates exceed unity, with the result being robust to the inclusion of both controls. 
Short-run estimates are the highest among the sample, indicating that CIT is the best automatic stabilizer. 
The same results hold when we control for the effects of expansionary and contractionary periods, with 
the whole tax system seeming to work better as an automatic stabilizer during bad times and CIT being 
the most effective policy tool.  
Regarding the Irish economy, the estimates for Total Tax and PIT revenues are lower compared to the 
median and statistically not different from one (both for the short- and the long-run). However, CIT 
buoyancy estimates exhibit the largest value, which indicates that CIT is in fact the most effective 
automatic stabilizer over the period under examination. Moreover, the estimates are robust to the 
inclusion of policy controls, which serve as proxies to changes in the tax system. In particular, this result 
that can be attributed to the long-run stability of the tax system, i.e. the fact that the tax policy rates have 
remained relatively stable in the period under examination. When controlling for the asymmetric effects 
of the business cycle on short-run buoyancy estimates, we can see that CIT seems to work better as an 
automatic stabilizer during periods of economic downturn, a result that holds for the tax system as a whole 
(although the total tax estimate is lower than the CIT estimate). Finally, it appears that the use of GNP as 
a measure of economic activity in Ireland leads to changes in the estimates for tax revenue buoyancies, 
which should be taken into account from a policy perspective (although, qualitatively, the results remain 
unchanged). 
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